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Abstract
We present a bit-string quantum oblivious transfer protocol based on single-qubit
rotations. Our protocol is built upon a previously proposed quantum public-key protocol
and its practical security relies on the laws of Quantum Mechanics. Practical security
is reflected in the fact that, due to technological limitations, the receiver (Bob) of the
transferred bit-string is restricted to performing only “few-qubit” coherent measurements.
We also present a single-bit oblivious transfer based on the proposed bit-string protocol.
The protocol can be implemented with current technology based on optics.
∗email: ansouto@fc.ul.pt
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1 Introduction
Since the success of quantum cryptography, which allowed for the exchange of secret keys [BB84,
Eke91, Ben92], and whose security is based on the laws of physics, instead of the unproven
mathematical conjectures, a hope appeared for designing various quantum protocols with im-
proved security, with respect to their classical counterparts. One of the basic protocols used in
building complex multiparty security schemes is the Oblivious Transfer (OT) Protocol (often
referred to as all-or-nothing OT).
OT can be seen as a game played by two parties, Alice and Bob. Alice has many secrets
that wishes to share with Bob in such a way that at the end, on average, Bob learns half of
those secrets and Alice does not know which secrets Bob really knows. Each instance of this
protocol, used to reveal in half of the cases Alice’s secret, is the Oblivious Transfer Protocol.
OT consists of two distinct phases: (i) the transferring phase, during which Alice sends an
encoded secret information to Bob; (ii) the opening phase, during which Alice reveals enough
information so that Bob can decode the secret with probability 1/2. Note that Bob knows if
he got the message or not.
OT is said to be secure if the following properties hold: (i) the protocol is concealing, i.e.,
before the opening phase, Bob is not able to learn the message sent by Alice, while after the
opening phase Bob learns the message with probability 1/2; (ii) the protocol is oblivious, i.e.,
after the opening phase, Alice remains oblivious to whether or not Bob got the message.
Rabin was the first to formally present an oblivious transfer protocol in 1981 [Rab81].
The security of Rabin’s OT relies on the fact that factoring large integers is not known to be
possible to perform in polynomial time on classical computers. Later, Even, Goldreich and
Lempel presented a variation of this scheme called 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [EGL85]. The
difference to Rabin’s OT is that Alice sends two messages and Bob gets only one of the two
with equal probability (again, Alice does not know which message Bob decoded). Although
differently defined, Cre´peau showed that when the messages are single bits the two flavours
of oblivious transfer protocols are equivalent, in the sense that one can be built out of the
other and vice versa [Cre´88]. Furthermore, one can build an 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer
protocol that transmits bit-string messages from 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol for
single bits [BCR86, CS93, BCS96].
The oblivious transfer is a building block of more complex security protocols [BCR86,
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Kil88, HL93] using Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao86], and various secure multiparty computation
schemes [CDM00, LP12, LZ13].
Another cryptographic primitive used in designing more complex secure protocols is bit
commitment [BCC88]. Although it is not possible to construct an OT protocol out of a
bit commitment [Sal99] it was shown that bit commitment can be reduced to 1-out-of-2
bit oblivious transfer protocol [BBCS92]. In Figure 1 we schematically present the classical
reductions between the above discussed cryptographic primitives.
Figure 1: Classical reductions between cryptographic primitives. The green arrows represent
straightforward reductions; the orange ones are non-trivial reductions; the red one is the
impossible implication.
Due to the advance of quantum computation and quantum information, the development
of cryptographic applications resilient to quantum adversaries has been extensively studied in
the last decades. Wiesner launched the field of quantum cryptography in 1969 by presenting
notions such as quantum money and quantum multiplexing (and only managed to publish his
results in 1983 [Wie83]), the latter being essentially a quantum counterpart of a 1-out-of-2
oblivious transfer protocol.
Further developing Wiesner ideas, Bennett and Brassard presented the well-known BB84
quantum key distribution protocol [BB84], which was subsequently showed to be uncon-
ditionally secure [LC99, SP00, May01, SBPC+09], while its classical counterparts are only
computationally secure. By “unconditionally secure” it is meant “secure, provided the agents
have unlimited power allowed by the laws of physics”. Nevertheless, inevitable imperfections
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in implementations lead to various practical levels of security. In the current study, we analyse
the theoretical security of our protocol, while leaving the details of particular implementations
for future work. Another example of a protocol whose quantum realisation outperforms its
classical counterpart is the recently proposed contract signing protocol [PBM11].
Despite these positive results, a number of no-go theorems imposed limits to quan-
tum cryptography. Independently, Lo and Chau [LC97], and Mayers [May97], showed that
unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol is impossible, within the scope
of non-relativistic physics (for unconditionally secure protocols that use relativistic effects,
see [Ken99, Ken05, BFGGS13]). Subsequently, Lo [Lo97] proved similar no-go theorem for
all “one-sided two-party computations” protocols. An immediate consequence of this result
is the impossibility of having secure 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. The alternative, ensur-
ing practical security of such protocols, is to consider noisy or bounded memories [WST08,
STW11, KWW12, NJM+12, BFGGS13, LAA+14, ALP+14, ASP+16]. Recently, a (quantum)
computationally secure version of oblivious transfer protocol was presented in [SMAaP15a].
Following the classical equivalence [Cre´88] between the two flavours of oblivious trans-
fer, one might conclude that the impossibility of having unconditionally secure 1-out-of-2
oblivious transfer would imply the same for oblivious transfer. But the rules of quantum
physics present a wider range of possibilities, thus potentially compromising classical reduc-
tion schemes. Namely, as to build the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer one has to run several
oblivious transfer protocols as black boxes, the possibility of the so-called coherent attacks –
joint quantum measurements on several black boxes – arises. Thus, having secure quantum
oblivious transfer protocol does not necessarily mean that it is possible to construct secure 1-
out-of-2 oblivious transfer. Indeed, He and Wang recently showed that in quantum domain the
various types of oblivious transfer are no longer equivalent [HW06b] and constructed a secure
quantum single-bit oblivious transfer [HW06a] using entanglement. Consequently, classical
reductions of single-bit to a bit-string protocols are also compromised in the quantum set-
ting and need to be re-examined. Recent example of constructing a secure quantum bit-string
commitment protocol [Ken03], despite the above mentioned no-go theorems for single-bit com-
mitment [LC97, May97] is yet another example of invalidity of classical reductions (see also
a quantum bit-string generation protocol [BM04]). Therefore, a need of explicitly construct-
ing quantum bit-string oblivious transfer protocol which is not based on classical reductions
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mentioned above arises [Cre´88, BCR86, CS93, BCS96]. In Figure 2 we present quantum re-
ductions between cryptographic primitives. Note that, despite the mentioned controversial
(and not widely accepted within the community) results by He and Wang [HW06b, HW06a],
the recent construction of a single-bit 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer out of an ordinary (i.e.,
all-or-nothing) OT [MP16] leaves the question of the equivalence between the two flavours of
the protocol open.
Figure 2: Quantum reductions between cryptographic primitives and no-go Theorems. The
green arrows represent straightforward reductions; the orange ones are non-trivial reductions;
the red ones are the impossible implications. Open questions are represented with a question
marks.
In this paper, we present a quantum oblivious transfer protocol for bit-strings, based on
the recently proposed public key cryptosystem [Nik08]. Each bit of the string to be transferred
is encoded in a quantum state of a qubit, in such a way that states corresponding to bit values
0 and 1 form an orthonormal basis. The key point of the protocol is that for each qubit, the
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encoding basis is chosen at random, from some discrete set of bases.
In the OT protocol, the two agents do not trust each other, and so no authentication is
required at this level. OT is a protocol that implements a channel to be used as a building
block of more complex multi-party computations. Nevertheless, at this higher level, classical
authentication might be required, which can be achieved by exchanging signed messages (using
pre-shared keys) via OT (see for example [Gol02], Section 2.3.2.3, p. 48). Alternatively,
OT can be used to achieve the very authentication between the agents [CDVW12]. In A,
we present details of the authentication mechanism performed at the level of multi-party
computation.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next Section, we present our OT protocol, while
in Section 3 we analyse the protocol’s security. Finally, in Section 4 we summarise the results
and present possible future lines of research. In B we present the technical details (notation,
definitions and results) used in the paper.
2 The protocol
In this section, we present the protocol that achieves oblivious transfer of a bit-string message
from Alice to Bob. The scheme uses hash functions which allow to certify if after the opening
phase Bob got the message or not. A hash function produces a digest of a message – a string
of smaller size – such that: (i) the probability of generating at random strings with the same
hash value is negligible; (ii) the hash values are almost uniformly distributed over the set of
all possible digests.
Our protocol is based on the public-key cryptosystem [Nik08], and can be briefly sum-
marised as follows (for more details, see B). Given a reference, so-called computational basis
β0 = {|0〉 , |1〉}, Alice first encodes each bit mi of the message (a string of bits)m = m1 . . . mk
into the state |mi〉 of the corresponding qubit. Then, she randomly chooses a bit value a,
and for each mi a rotation angle ϕi (taken from a given set of angles Φ), and rotates |mi〉 by
(−1)aϕi. Finalising the transferring phase, she sends the qubits to Bob. Note that for each
qubit i the encoding quantum states
|0(a)i 〉 = R((−1)aϕi) |0〉 (1)
|1(a)i 〉 = R((−1)aϕi) |1〉 = R(π) |0(a)i 〉 , (2)
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where rotations R(ϕ) are defined by R(ϕ) |0〉 = cos(ϕ/2) |0〉 + i sin(ϕ/2) |1〉, are mutually
orthogonal and hence fully distinguishable, provided one knows the direction a and the angle
ϕi of the rotation. Therefore, Bob cannot decipher the message m, unless given additional
information about the encoding bases βi = {|0(a)i 〉 , |1(a)i 〉}. In Figure 3, we present a schematic
description when the length of the message to be transferred is k.
Figure 3: Schematic description of the transferring phase of our oblivious transfer protocol for
messages of length k. The full arrows represent the actual states of qubits, while the dashed
arrows in the last two lines (encryption of a message) represent |0i〉 states.
In the opening phase, Alice provides Bob with such (partial) information: she sends the
so-called secret key, a string ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕk) of rotation angles, but not the rotation direction
a. Oblivious to the rotation direction, Bob can only guess it, which he will get correctly in
50% of the cases.
Encrypted in quantum states of qubits, Alice sends the message m, together with its
digest d = h(m), given by a suitably chosen hash function h : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ω , with
ω = ⌊√k⌋. Upon decrypting the states of qubits sent by Alice, Bob recovers a string which
is a concatenation of the form m′d′. Note that m′ and d′ are not necessarily the message
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m and its hash value d = h(m). Bob checks if d′ = h(m′). If so, he is convinced that the
received message m′ is indeed the intended message m (for technical details, see Section 3).
Below, we present a rigorous description of our bit-string OT protocol. The parameters
that determine the protocol’s security levels are k, n ∈ N, with k being the length of the
message, while n defines the “elementary rotation angle” θn = π/2
n−1. The rotation angles
are then given by ϕi = siθn, where si ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1}. For the reasons of simplicity, we will
use the term “secret key” for both the string of rotation angles ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕk+ω), as well
as the string of numbers s = (s1, . . . , sk+ω) that determine them. Before the opening phase,
all the information about the protocol parameters are private to Alice, while the only public
information is the hash function h (note that knowing the hash function, one knows k and ω
as well). At the beginning of the opening phase, Alice (publicly) announces to Bob n and s.
Protocol 1 (Bit-string OT).
Security parameters: k, n ∈ N, with θn = π/2n−1;
Message to transfer: m = m1 . . . mk;
Hash function: h : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ω, with ω = ⌊√k⌋;
Secret key: s = (s1, . . . , sk+ω), where each si ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1}.
Transferring phase:
1. Alice chooses uniformly at random the hash function h and a bit a ∈
{0, 1} and prepares the following state (with d = h(m), and di being its
ith bit):
|ψ〉 =
k⊗
i=1
R(miπ + (−1)a × siθn) |0〉
ω⊗
i=1
R(di)π + (−1)a × si+kθn) |0〉 (3)
=
(
k⊗
i=1
[
cos
(
miπ + (−1)a × siθn
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
miπ + (−1)a × siθn
2
)
|1〉
])
⊗ (4)
(
ω⊗
i=1
[
cos
(
diπ + (−1)a × si+kθn
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
hiπ + (−1)a × si+kθn
2
)
|1〉
])
2. Alice sends the state |ψ〉 to Bob.
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Opening phase:
3. Alice sends to Bob the secret key s = (s1, . . . , sk+ω), the security param-
eter n.
4. Bob checks if s is likely to be a possible output of a random process.
5. Bob chooses uniformly at random a′ ∈ {0, 1} and applies R((−1)a′siθn)
to each qubit of |ψ〉.
6. Bob applies the measurement operator M⊗(k+ω) = (0 × |0〉 〈0| + 1 ×
|1〉 〈1|)⊗(k+ω).
7. Let m′d′ be the message that Bob recovers (notice that here d′ is a bit-
string, a potential value of the hash, and not a function itself). He checks
if d′ = h(m′). If that is the case then Bob is almost sure that m′ = m,
otherwise he knows that m′ is not the correct message.
Notice that knowing h(m) can potentially reveal the whole set Am of the strings mapped
to the same value of hash. Knowing Am decreases Bob’s uncertainty about the unknown
string m, thus effectively revealing ω = ⌊√k⌋ bits of information about string m. This
information may help Bob to increase the probability of finding m, thus compromising the
security of the protocol. Therefore we encrypt both the message m and h(m) into a quantum
state sent by Alice. Since, in order to confirm that he obtained the message m, Bob needs to
learn the value h(m) as well, one can consider the concatenated string mh(m) as a message
to be transferred. For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we will denote mh(m) as a single
message m to be transferred. Note though, that there are correlations between the message
m and the value h(m), which might become relevant for the Concealing property, and in
particular for achieving the Probabilistic transfer, after Bob learns the particular function m
chosen by Alice. We will address this issue when discussing the above mentioned cases.
In Step 4 Bob checks if the secret key s was indeed randomly chosen. By encoding si’s
into binary numbers Alice has to provide an n × (k + ω) long bit-string produced by a fair
coin. A number of possible tests of random-number generators exist in literature, such as
χ2, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Serial correlation, Two-level, K-distributivity, Serial and Spectral
tests (for more details, see [Jai91], Chapter 27). Step 4 of the protocol is used to overcome
the hypothetical chance of Alice to cheat by sending particular elements si of the secret key
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s which allow Bob to recover the message with probability close to 1. Notice that if si is
such that the angle of rotation is ϕi = siθn/2 = 0, or ϕi = siθn/2 = π/2, then Bob will with
certainty get the correct bit value mi. Therefore, if the elements si of the secret key were
close to 0 or π/2, Alice would know with probability significantly higher than 1/2 that Bob
received the message m (for a detailed analysis of possible cheating strategies of Alice, see
below the proof of the obliviousness criterion). If all si’s were indeed chosen uniformly at
random, than significant portion of them would not be close to 0 nor π/2, preventing Alice
from cheating.
Nevertheless, for the protocol to be secure, a much simpler criterion can be used, one
that is satisfied whenever a string is indeed produced uniformly at random. If Alice chooses
each si uniformly at random, then on average half of such choices satisfy ϕi = siθn/2 ∈
[π/8, 3π/8] ∪ [5π/8, 7π/8]. These si’s are already far enough from 0 and π/2 to secure the
protocol against cheating Alice. For a detailed discussion on the degree of Bob’s confidence
against cheating strategies of Alice, see below the proof of the obliviousness criterion.
Typically, bit-string protocols achieve required security levels for suitably large lengths
of messages, as is the case in Kent’s protocol [Ken03], for example (for more details see
Section 3). Nevertheless, having a secure bit-string OT protocol by encrypting single bits by
sufficiently large messages, one can design secure single-bit OT. Below, we present a simple
way of using our protocol to achieve oblivious transfer of a single bit b by sending a bit-string
message m.
Protocol 2 (Single-bit oblivious transfer).
Message to transfer: b;
Security parameters: k and n;
1. Alice chooses bit b.
2. Alice chooses a 2k-bit message m, such that
k⊕
i=1
mi ×mk+i = b.
3. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 1.
4. If Bob had got the right message m, then he performs
k⊕
i=1
mi × mk+i = b.
Otherwise, he cannot recover the bit.
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3 Security analysis
In this section, we analyse the security of our oblivious transfer protocol. Oblivious transfer
has to satisfy the following four properties (the first express the correctness while the last
three assure the security of the protocol):
Soundness: If both Alice and Bob are honest, then with probability 1/2 Bob will obtain
the right message. While Bob knows if he got the right message or not, Alice is oblivious
of that fact.
Concealingness: If Alice is honest Bob cannot learn the whole message that Alice meant
to send before the opening phase (the protocol is concealing).
Probabilistic transfer: After the opening phase, Bob cannot learn the whole message
in more than 50% of the cases (with probability higher than 1/2).
Obliviousness: If Bob is honest then Alice does not know if Bob received the message –
she can only guess with probability 1/2 (the protocol is oblivious).
In case of bit-string protocols, the probability 1/2 that appears in the above definition of
Soundness and Probabilistic transfer properties (but not Obliviousness) is relaxed to 1/2 +
ε(k), where k is the length of the message and ε : N → R is a negligible function, i.e., for
every positive polynomial p there exists a k0 ∈ N such that for all k > k0, ε(k) ≤ 1/p(k)
(for the definition and a detailed overview of the use of the notion of negligible functions in
cryptography, see for example [Gol04]).
Note that Bob can get a part of the message m with certainty, as long as the number of
additional bits that he has to guess is larger than a polylogarithmic function of k (a function
is polylogarithmic if it can be written in the form f(x) =
∑
i ci log
pi(x), for fixed constants ci
and powers pi, see for example [Bla04]). This means that the uncertainty of the entire message
is greater than any polylogarithmic function of k. For instance, in the case a cheating Bob
can learn all but
√
k bits of the message, the probability of him guessing properly the whole
message is 2−
√
k (i.e., Bob’s uncertainty of the whole message is
√
k). This way, Alice can
use our protocol to send
√
k bits of information of a shorter string i whenever the transfer
is successfully achieved; otherwise, Bob’s probability to learn the intended information i is
negligible (e.g., of the order of 2−
√
k; note that the quadratic increases in the resources is
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common and acceptable in implementation of communication protocols). To do this, she
can use an error-correcting code that can correct up to
√
k errors. Such code consists of
cells (“codewords”) each of size 2
√
k. By randomly choosing the cell, and encoding i in one
of its 2
√
k elements, Bob is left without virtually any knowledge of i whenever the OT is
unsuccessful: by being able to learn (k − √k) bits of m he can at most identify the cell,
but not i (the uncertainty of the received string m is precisely
√
k). Note the importance
of stating the security criterion in terms of negligible functions, i.e., in terms of asymptotic
behaviour, with respect to the message length (be it k of m or, through the error-correcting
code,
√
k of i), of the probabilities to learn (parts of) the information sent, which is a standard
approach in cryptography and computer science (see for example [Gol04], where negligible
functions are introduced already in the Introduction).
In general, both quantum and classical cryptographic security protocols for exchanging
messages depend on several parameters, one of them being the length of the message. As a
rule, such protocols are said to be secure if, provided that the other parameters are suitably
chosen, the cheating probability is negligible with respect to the length of the message, which
is satisfied asymptotically, i.e., for sufficiently large values of k.
In our case, as well as in the case of the public-key scheme presented in [Nik08] (on which
our protocol is based; see also the related recent scheme based on quantum walks [VRM+15]),
one such parameter is n, and for both protocols the level of security indeed depends on the
choice of n. Nevertheless, as proven in [Nik08], with a proper choice of n, the public-key
scheme is secure against eavesdropping. Consequently, with the same choice of a proper n,
our protocol is Sound (correct), Concealing (before the opening phase Bob cannot learn the
message sent by Alice) and achieves Probabilistic transfer (on average, Bob receives half of
the messages sent by Alice). On the other hand, the last security criterion (Obliviousness)
does not depend on the choice of n, as shown in the respective proofs presented below.
Note that in [Nik08], in order to further reduce the probability of a successful attack,
security parameter n was treated as a part of the secret key (together with s). But it was
noted that the protocol would still be secure even if n were public. In a subsequent paper
[SNA12], in which the robustness of the public-key cryptosystem introduced in [Nik08] was
further analysed, n was treated as a part of a public key, i.e., the cryptosystem is secure even if
(a properly chosen) n were known. Note that in both cases, according to the above definition,
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the protocol is secure, but with different negligible functions ε(k): when n is private, the
corresponding negligible function is smaller than when n is public.
Definitions of Soundness, Concealingness and Probabilistic transfer properties have some-
what weak requirement of Bob not being able to learn the whole message m before and in
(about) half of the cases after the opening phase. According to this definition, even if Bob
were able to learn all but, say the last bit of the message, the protocol would still be secure.
One can adopt a stronger criterion, requiring that only with negligible probability Bob can
learn with certainty part of m which would allow him to infer, with non-negligible probability,
the rest of the message. In other words, to require that the acquired information cannot
help Bob to improve his chances of guessing m, in a sense that before and after receiving
quantum (and classical) key(s), Bob’s chances to correctly guess the whole m are negligible
in the length of the message. Such security criterion is in the spirit of the one presented in
the classic paper [EGL85] introducing 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol.
Note that even in the case of the correct inference of the rest of the message, a cheating
Bob can still not know with certainty whether the guess was correct, which is weaker position
than that of an honest player who knows with certainty if the message is received. Note
that by sheer guessing, Bob will always, on average, correctly infer half of the bits of m, but
without knowing which bits he guessed right. To say that Bob knows certain part of the
message means to know both the values and the corresponding positions of the known bits.
Thus, there is a difference between knowing the message (as required by the definition of the
protocol), and being right in inferring (guessing) the message.
As we show below, regarding Concealingness, our protocol satisfies the strongest possible
requirement: no part of the message can be known at all (with certainty). Indeed, upon
obtaining a string of qubits from Alice, Bob can at best learn the whole quantum state of the
system received. Since each quantum state |ψ〉 sent by an honest Alice can, for a suitable
choice of the secret key s = (s1, . . . , sk+ω), encode any string md ∈ Σk+ω, before the opening
phase Bob is completely clueless of any part of the message sent.
Regarding Probabilistic transfer, we show that, providing that Bob is constrained to
perform only “few-qubit” coherent measurements, he can at best with probability of 1/2
learn all but the first
√
k bits of the message. Nevertheless, the probability to successfully
infer the missing
√
k bits is 2−
√
k, i.e., negligible in the length of the message. By “few-qubit”
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coherent measurements we mean that Bob cannot perform a joint measurement on more
than a given finite number of qubits, a reasonable practical constraint for today’s and any
not-so-far future technology.
3.1 Soundness of the protocol
In the following we prove the soundness of our protocol: if both parties are honest, then with
probability 1/2+ ε(k) Bob will get the right message, where ε(k) is negligible function on the
size of the message m = m1 . . . mk.
First assume that Alice and Bob had chosen to rotate the state in opposite directions,
i.e., a 6= a′. Without loss of generality assume that Alice chooses a = 0, to rotate clockwise
all the qubits. The qubits Alice sent to Bob are in the following state:
|ψ〉 =
k⊗
i=1
R(miπ + siθn) |0〉 (5)
=
k⊗
i=1
cos
(
miπ + siθn
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
miπ + siθn
2
)
|1〉 . (6)
In the opening phase Bob receives from Alice the additional information, the secret key
s = (s1, . . . , sk).
By the assumption, Bob decides to rotate each qubit received from Alice counterclockwise
(a′ = 1) by −siθn. The states he gets are either |0〉 or |1〉. In fact:
R(−siθn)(R(miπ + siθn) |0〉) = R(miπ) |0〉 (7)
= cos
(
miπ
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
miπ
2
)
|1〉 (8)
= |mi〉 . (9)
Bob measures M = 0 × |0〉 〈0| + 1 × |1〉 〈1| on the above state and the result is mi with
probability 1 (note that for mi = 0 we have cos(miπ/2) = 1, and analogously for mi = 1).
We conclude that if Bob chooses to rotate in the direction contrarily to Alice’s choice, then
with probability 1 Bob will recover the bit sent by Alice.
On the other hand, if Alice and Bob decide to rotate each qubit of the message in the
same direction (a = a′), say clockwise, the qubits’ states are transformed into (i = 1 . . . k):
14
R(siθn)(R(miπ+siθn) |0〉) = R(miπ + 2siθn)|0〉) (10)
= cos
(
2siθn +miπ
2
)
|0〉+sin
(
2siθn +miπ
2
)
|1〉 (11)
= |m˜i〉 . (12)
If mi = 0 then the above state becomes |m˜i〉 = cos (siθn) |0〉+sin (siθn) |1〉 and by measuring
the qubit with M = 0 × |0〉 〈0| + 1 × |1〉 〈1| Bob gets the correct answer with probability
cos2(siθn); if mi = 1 then the above state becomes |m˜i〉 = − sin (siθn) |0〉+ cos (siθn) |1〉 and
again Bob gets the correct bit with probability cos2(siθn). Hence
Pr (mi;M, |m˜i〉) = cos2(siθn). (13)
Assuming that the key s is chosen at random, the probability of recovering the whole
message by rotating in the wrong direction becomes negligible, and the expected probability
of recovering message m, when measuring M⊗k, on the state |ψ′〉 = ⊗ki=1R((−1)a′siθn) |ψ〉
is:
Pr(m;M⊗k, |ψ′〉) = Pr(a′ 6=a)×Pr(m|a′ 6=a)+Pr(a′=a)×Pr(m|a′=a) (14)
≤ 1
2
+
1
2
k∏
i=1
cos2(siθn). (15)
The two cases, a′ 6= a and a′ = a, occur both with probability 1/2. While in the first
case Bob always gets m correctly, in the second, the probability given by the random val-
ues si chosen by Alice, is given by
k∏
i=1
cos2(siθn). To see that ε(k) =
1
2
k∏
i=1
cos2(siθn) is
negligible, notice that on average half of values for the rotation angles siθn/2 fall in the re-
gion [π/8; 3π/8] ∪ [5π/8; 7π/8], for which cos(siθn) <
√
2 +
√
2/2, giving the upper bound
ε(k) ≤ 2−k/2.
Given θn, one can estimate the average value ε¯(k) as a function of the message length k,
thus obtaining the security level of the protocol’s soundness criterion. The current technology
available at the market allows for the accuracy of the state of polarisation (SOP) of about
0.2◦ on Poincare´ sphere (see the accuracy specifications of the “Polarization Instrumentation”
at [Tho17]). This roughly corresponds to the case of n = 10, for which on Figure 4 we plot
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the expectation value ε¯(k), for 100 randomly chosen strings s. As one can see, already for the
messages of four letters the “access” probability ε¯(k)/2 is of the order of 0.01.
5 10 15 20
k
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
ϵ (k)
n = 10
Figure 4: The expected value ε¯(k), for n = 10 and 100 randomly chosen strings s.
The information received by Bob consists of two parts: one corresponding to the actual
message sent by Alice, and the other corresponding to its hash value. At the end of the
protocol, Bob checks if he recovered the correct message by comparing its hash value with
the latter part of information received. Note that by the properties of hash functions, the
probability that the hash of the first part matches the second one is negligible in the case Alice
and Bob performed the same rotation (see B for more detailed description of the properties
of hash functions).
3.2 Concealingness of the protocol
In this subsection we show that if Alice is honest, the probability of Bob recovering Alice’s
message before the opening phase is negligible. Furthermore, after the opening phase Bob
recovers the message with, up to a negligible value, probability 1/2.
The first part of the statement follows directly from the security of the public-key cryp-
tosystem [Nik08] (see the discussion on one-way functions and state distinguishability in B),
and is basically a consequence of the fact that, depending on the secret key component si,
the same state |ψi〉 of a single qubit can be encrypting either a 0 or a 1: for each si there
exists s′i such that |ψi〉 = R(siθn) |0〉 encrypts 0, while |ψi〉 = R(s′iθn + π) |0〉 encrypts 1. In
fact, before the opening phase, our protocol is as secure as the cryptosystem underlying it.
We stress that the additional information provided by Alice, the hash function cannot
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help Bob recovering the message m. In fact, below, we prove that even if Bob had access
directly to the hash value h(m) this would not help him (note that since the value h(m) is
encrypted makes Bob’s task even harder). In the following, we provide the reasoning for a
particular hash function.
Given a message m, consider its partition into ω = ⌊√k⌋ consecutive blocks of bits m¯i
(i = 1, . . . ω), each with length ⌊√k⌋: m = m¯1 . . . m¯ω. Each bit di = hi(m) of the hash value
d = h(m) is the parity of the i-th block of the message m: d1 = h1(m) = m1⊕ . . .⊕mω, etc.
Hence, all the bits of d = h(m) are mutually independent.
Suppose that d = h(m) allows to recoverm with some non-negligible probability p. Then,
in particular, the bit d1 = h1(m) helps to recover the possible block m¯1 = m1⊕ . . .⊕mω, with
the same probability p. We claim that this is impossible, assuming that the cryptosystem
[Nik08], used to design our protocol, is secure.
In fact, if a cryptosystem is secure for coding a message m of length k, then a fortiori the
encryption of a polynomially shorter message, say m¯1, is also secure. So, if d1 = h1(m) would
help to recover the first block with non negligible probability p then, by randomly guessing
the value d1 = h1(m) (that will be correct with probability 1/2), it would be possible to break
the cryptosystem presented in [Nik08] with non-negligible probability p/2.
One can easily describe other hash functions by considering all possible forms of dividing
k elements into groups of ω elements, i.e., by using the above hash function h on the permuted
message. Given a permutation π ∈ Sk of length k, one can define the hash function hπ(m) =
hidk(mπ(1) . . . mπ(k)), where hidk is the above h. Obviously, the concealing property is valid
for all hash functions in the set {hπ|π ∈ Sk}.
3.3 Probabilistic transfer of the protocol
After receiving the secret key s, Bob’s description of the qubits sent by Alice is given by
the mixed state (for convenience, we consider a ∈ {+,−}, where “+” stands for clockwise
rotation and “−” otherwise):
ρB(s) =
1
2
∑
a∈{+,−}
(
1
2
)k∑
m1∈{0,1}
. . .
∑
mk∈{0,1}
|m1(s1)〉a〈m1(s1)| ⊗ . . .⊗ |mk(sk)〉a〈mk(sk)| , (16)
where |mi(si)〉± = cos
(
miπ
2 ± siθn2
)
|0〉 + sin
(
miπ
2 ± siθn2
)
|1〉. The single-qubit partial states
are completely mixed, and can be written in the following suitable form: ρB(si) =
1
2(ρ0(si)+
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ρ1(si)), where ρmi(si) =
1
2 (|mi(si)〉+〈mi(si)| + |mi(si)〉−〈mi(si)|). Note though that the
overall state ρB(s) is not a tensor product of single-qubit states: the rotation direction a is
the same for all qubit thus correlating single-qubits. Nevertheless, if Bob is constrained to
perform only few-qubit coherent measurements, these correlations, as well as the knowledge
of d = h(m), cannot help him to increase the probability of learning m.
First, we give the proof for the case of single-qubit measurements. As before, the hash
function h is determined by the parity of blocks m¯i of size ω. Since the parity of block m¯i is
completely uncorrelated to the value of each of its bits, unless we know the values of all other
ω − 1 remaining bits, the choice of the optimal single-qubit measurement of at least ω − 1
qubits of a single block does not depend on the hash value di = hi(m).
The correlations between single-qubit states established by the same choice of the rotation
direction cannot help either. A possible cheating strategy would be to, as prescribed by the
protocol, randomly choose the rotation direction, and perform the corresponding measurement
on first few qubits only. With probability 1/2 the choice will be right, and the bits would
be correctly decrypted; with probability 1/2 though, the wrong choice would lead to wrong
decryption which, in case Bob can detect it, would result in measuring the right observable
on the remaining qubits. But Bob can detect the wrong choice only by comparing the results
with the hash value, the parity of blocks of length ω. Thus, only upon measuring all qubits
of at least one block of size ω Bob can spot the mistake. This however leaves him uncertain
which, among 2ω−1 possible messages, was the message sent by Alice, which are exponentially
many on the size k of the whole message m (note that ω =
√
k). Thus, since for each si the
states ρ0(si) and ρ1(si) are not fully distinguishable, what Bob can do is to try to distinguish
between the two states as best as possible.
The optimal probability of guessing bit’s value mi is then given by the Helstrom for-
mula [Hel69]:
PH(ρ0(si), ρ1(si)) =
1
2
+
1
4
Tr|ρ0(si)− ρ1(si)| = 1
2
(1 + | cos(siθn)|). (17)
Note that the optimal observable for such measurement is the same for each possible si, and
is given by the computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉} (see Figure 5). Analogously as in the proof
of soundness of the protocol, since on average half of values si satisfy | cos(siθn)| ≤ 1/
√
2,
we have ε(k) ≤ q−k/2, where q = 12 (1 + 1/
√
2) < 1. It follows that the probability to guess
any non-negligible number of bits is still negligible (by “negligible number of bits” we mean
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the number of bits such that, knowing their values the probability to guess the rest of m is
negligible).
Figure 5: The optimal discrimination between the bit values 0, encoded in quantum state
ρ0(si) =
1
2(|0(si)〉+〈0(si)| + |0(si)〉−〈0(si)|), and the bit value 1, ρ1(si) = 12(|1(si)〉+〈1(si)|+
|1(si)〉−〈1(si)|). The optimal observable is given by the vectors from the computational basis,
|0〉 for inferring the bit value 0, and |1〉 for inferring the bit value 1. Note that ϕi = siθn/2.
Suppose now Bob is allowed to perform at most two-qubit coherent measurements. Then,
for each pair, say (s1, s2), the four quantum states
ρ00(s1s2) =
1
2
(ρ+00(s1s2) + ρ
−
00(s1s2)) (18)
=
1
2
(|0(s1)0(s2)〉+〈0(s1)0(s2)|+ |0(s1)0(s2)〉−〈0(s1)0(s2)|), (19)
(and analogously for ρ01(s1s2), ρ10(s1s2) and ρ11(s1s2)), would also not be fully distinguish-
able. Therefore, the optimal strategy that Bob can adopt will produce wrong decryption,
with finite error probability q > 0. As in the case of single-qubit measurements, this leads to
negligible advantage over the 1/2 probability of recovering m, given sufficiently large k (and
thus the block length ω =
√
k).
Given the maximal length ℓ of the multi-qubit measurement, each block m˜ of length
ℓ is from Bob’s point of view described by the mixed state ρm˜(˜s) =
1
2(ρ
+
m˜
(˜s) + ρ−
m˜
(˜s)) =
1
2(|m˜(˜s)〉+〈m˜(˜s)|+ |m˜(˜s)〉−〈m˜(˜s)|), where s˜ is the part of the secret key s corresponding to
the block m˜. As ℓ increases, the states |m˜(˜s)〉± and |m˜′(˜s)〉±, corresponding to two different
messages m˜ and m˜′, become increasingly distinguishable. The precise relation between the
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maximal length ℓ of the allowed coherent measurements and the size k of the message m will
be addressed in a separate study.
To summarise, the crucial nontrivial part of the proof of the probabilistic transfer criterion
restricted to few-qubit measurements is to show that the probability to learn m is negligible,
i.e., it scales faster than the inverse of any polynomial on the length of the message. Since
the few-qubit states of the “maximal length” ℓ on which Bob performs the measurements are
not fully distinguishable, he will infer correctly that part of the message only with probability
pℓ strictly smaller than 1. Thus, upon repeating the finite-length few-qubit measurements
t = k/ℓ times, the probability of correctly inferring the whole message scales exponentially
to zero as ptℓ = p
k/ℓ
ℓ = (
ℓ
√
pℓ)
k, which, given the behaviour of pℓ (a subject of a future study)
provides the explicit relation between the message length k and the maximal measurement
length ℓ, for a desired security level. Thus, given the message length k and the desired security
level ε (upper value for the probability to cheat), one can determine the fixed “maximal
length” ℓ of allowed multi-qubit joint measurement by solving the equation ε = ( ℓ
√
pℓ)
k on
ℓ. Note that by “multi-qubit joint measurement” we mean any kind of generalised POVM
allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics. Further, to perform the analysis of the relation
between k and ℓ, it is enough to find a suitable upper bound of pℓ < 1.
3.4 Obliviousness of the protocol
To finish the security discussion we prove that the protocol is oblivious: at the end of the
protocol Alice does not know whether Bob received the right message of not.
At the end of the protocol, since Bob performs only local operations and measurements,
without communicating to Alice, she has no way of knowing if Bob had chosen the right ro-
tation, or not. Note that no entanglement without subsequent communication can be used to
exchange/acquire information. Otherwise, one could achieve faster-than-light communication,
thus explicitly violating causality and the principle of relativity. Indeed, what entanglement
affects are the correlations: Bell inequalities are given in terms of various correlation func-
tions, and the violation of local realism can be observed only upon distant observers exchange
the results of their local measurements. The prominent bit-commitment cheating strategy
discovered independently by Lo and Chao [LC97] and Mayers [May95] does involve entangle-
ment, but in addition to performing a suitable measurement on her halves of entangled pairs,
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a cheating Alice has to, subsequently, send her measurement outcomes to Bob. Therefore,
if being honest and sending the state prescribed by the Protocol, Alice cannot know if an
honest Bob received the message or not.
To increase her probability of knowing if Bob received the message or not, a cheating Alice
can try sending a cheating state |ψch〉 that would, with probability significantly higher than
1/2 (ideally, with probability 1), reveal m independently of Bob’s choice of rotation (obvi-
ously, in order to maintain the 50% of Bob’s success, Alice has to send a statistical mixture of
different cheating states, some having the mentioned “success probability” significantly higher
than 1/2, the others significantly lower). Note that in our protocol no entanglement between
Alice and qubits sent to Bob could possibly help her to cheat, by adapting the so-called
Mayers-Lo-Chau type of attack, which indeed enables Alice to successfully cheat during the
execution of a quantum bit-commitment protocol (the essence of the mentioned no-go theo-
rem [LC97, May97]). In order to evade the binding criterion of the bit-commitment protocol
(the requirement that after making the commitment to a bit value, it is not possible to change
it during the opening phase of the protocol), Alice establishes perfect correlations between
her and Bob’s results for one of the two different choices of local measurement bases (com-
putational for committing to 0, and diagonal for committing to 1), i.e., during the opening
phase she informs Bob which measurement to perform. In our protocol, if using entanglement
to cheat, the choice of pairs of local observables, for which perfect (or at least, better than
random) correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results is achieved, is irrelevant.
Thus, Alice performing local measurements on entangled states is equivalent to locally prepar-
ing at her site a simple statistical mixture of the corresponding collapsed Bob’s states, and
then sending them to him. Thus, the entanglement strategy is indeed equivalent to sending
simple statistical mixture of non-entangled states. Below, we show that for every quantum
state |ψch〉 of Bob’s particle, the probability to obtain the intended message (and thus the
probability of Alice’s inference that Bob obtained the message) is bounded from above by a
function that is exponentially close, with respect to the message length k, to 1/2.
Let l be the number of si’s for which ϕi = siθn/2 ∈ [π/8; 3π/8] ∪ [5π/8; 7π/8]. For such
cases we can consider the rearranged secret key s = s1 . . . sl and the corresponding message
m = m1 . . . ml. Depending on his choice of rotation direction a
′ Bob will measure one of the
two observables C±(s) =
∑2l−1
m=0m×P±(m; s), where one-dimensional projectors are given by
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P±(m; s) =
⊗l
i=0 P±(mi; si) =
⊗l
i=0 |mi(si)〉±〈mi(si)| and messages (bit-strings) m are seen
as binary numbers.
For given m and s Alice wants to maximize the probability Prch of Bob obtaining m
measuring C±(s) on |ψch〉 (and thus her probability of knowing if he got the message or not),
which is given by
Prch =
1
2
(
||P+(s) |ψch〉 ||2 + ||P−(s) |ψch〉 ||2
)
. (20)
The state |ψch〉 that maximizes the above expression is the equal superposition of |+〉 =
l∏
i=1
|mi(si)〉+ and |−〉 =
l∏
i=1
|mi(si)〉−. Thus, we have:
Prch ≤ 1
2
(1 + | 〈+|−〉 |) ≤ 1
2
(
1 + cosl(π/8)
)
. (21)
If the values si were produced uniformly at random, then the probability that ϕi =
siθn/2 ∈ [π/8; 3π/8]∪ [5π/8; 7π/8] is 1/2. As a consequence, the random variable that counts
the number l of such ϕi’s follow the binomial distribution B(k, 1/2), with k being the number
of trials (the total number of rotation angles ϕi, equal to the length of the messagem) and 1/2
being the success probability of each trial (where by “success” we mean that the rotation angle
falls within the above mentioned intervals). For sufficiently large k, the binomial distribution
can be approximated by the normal distribution N (µ, σ2) with the mean µ = k/2 and the
variance σ2 = k/4. This allows Bob to set the degree of confidence of Alice’s obliviousness.
For example, choosing the 3σ criterion, if (k − 3√k)/2 ≤ l ≤ (k + 3√k)/2 Alice’s probability
to learn if Bob got the message or not will be Prch = 1/2 + ε(k), where ε(k) is negligible
(which happens in 99.8% of the cases if si were chosen uniformly at random).
Regarding the quantitative evaluation of the security levels against the cheating agents
in terms of θn and k, we note that one can perform the estimation analogous to the one
performed for the soundness criterion, presented above in Section 3.1. Indeed, the security
levels, given through the cheating probabilities, are for the probabilistic transfer and the
(single-qubit measurements) obliviousness criteria given by (17) and (20), respectively, which
have the similar dependence on the values cos(siθn), for a given s, to that of ε(k) from (15).
Regarding the concealingness criterion presented in Section 3.2, while estimating its numerical
security in terms of θn and k is, for general coherent multi-qubit measurements, a non-trivial
task, one can straightforwardly see that the numerical expressions for the security levels for
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the case of single- and few-qubit measurements would again involve expressions similar the
the ones considered above, given in terms of cos(siθn).
Finally, we note that, according to the security criterion adopted in this paper, our OT pro-
tocol is secure against violating only one out of those three criteria (concealingness, probabilis-
tic transfer and obliviousness), while keeping the other two satisfied. In case a cheating Alice
decides not to send a message at all (by sending a wrong secret key s), she knows with certainty
that Bob will not receive it (the protocol is not oblivious), at the same time violating the prob-
abilistic requirement. This compromises the mentioned Cre´peau’s reduction [Cre´88] to a 1-
out-of-2 OT, as the cheating Alice would know with probability 1/2 which of the two messages
Bob chose to receive [He15]. Nevertheless, using the reduction presented in [CDSMW09] and
a bit-commitment protocol (such as those presented in [Ken99, Ken05, NJM+12, LAA+14]),
one can achieve a 1-out-of-2 OT through the Cre´peau’s reduction based on a protocol such
as ours (see [SMAaP15b] for a detailed discussion on the example of the computationally
secure OT presented in[SMAaP15a]). Moreover, one can use our protocol to achieve two-
party computation even without the help of a bit commitment. The semi-honest 1-out-of-2
OT based on our OT protocol is insecure against a cheating Alice. Due to the symmetry
of the OT protocol [WW06], it can be further transformed into a semi-honest 1-out-of-2
OT insecure against a cheating Bob, who would with probability 1/2 obtain both messages
sent by Alice (and only one in the remaining half of the cases). This is nothing but the
“cut-and-choose OT primitive”, introduced in [LP11] and further developed in [Lin16], which
allows for two-party computation (for cut-and-choose protocols on garbled circuits [Yao86],
see also [LP07, MR13, SS11]).
Note that the security of the complex multi-party protocols is at most as high as the
security of their building blocks: for a complex scheme to have certain level of security, its
building blocks have to maintain the same security level, but this is not enough – a complex
scheme could be insecure against, say, coherent measurements performed over all of its build-
ing blocks, etc. Our protocol is proven secure only against “few-qubit measurements”, i.e.,
it is only practically secure, its security being guaranteed by the technological limitations.
Thus, our reduction to a single-bit OT, as well as the above mentioned application [LP11]
to achieve multi-party computation without the use of BC, are proven to be only practically,
and not unconditionally, secure. Note that the latter is a classical reduction, thus further
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compromising its security which, according to Lo-Chau-Mayers no-go results, cannot be un-
conditional. As a consequence, no matter how high the security level our bit-string OT has,
this fact alone is not in contradiction with Lo-Chao-Mayers no-go theorems.
In case it turns out that our protocol is indeed insecure against general coherent at-
tacks, such result would support the impossibility of unconditionally secure single-bit all-or-
nothing OT (anticipated by the significant portion of the community), and be in tune with
the proven no-go theorems, in connection to the above-mentioned multi-party computation
scheme [LP11]. Nevertheless, from the technical point of view, it would be interesting to see
the particular coherent attack.
In case it turns out that our protocol is secure against general coherent attacks, it would
not directly contradict no-go theorems, as our proposal is a bit-string all-or-nothing OT
which, similarly to a bit-string commitment, in quantum domain does not necessarily have
to be equivalent to a single-bit counterpart. Nevertheless, the question of the security level
of our reduction from a bit-string to a single-bit all-or-nothing OT becomes an interesting
one. In this case, two possible outcomes are: (i) similarly to the case of the application
to multi-party computation [LP11], our reduction is insecure against coherent attacks (for
example, proving the security against learning the string of bits does not necessarily mean
that a cheating Bob cannot learn its parity instead, thus breaking the reduction security),
or (ii) our single-bit all-or-nothing OT is secure against coherent attacks. Note that, while
the predominant opinion within the community is that such security level is impossible, there
exists an opposite controversial result [HW06a], accompanied by the concrete construction
of allegedly secure all-or-nothing OT [HW06b]. Despite the recent proposal of the reduction
from all-or-nothing to 1-out-of-2 OT [MP16], there exists no broadly accepted clearcut proof
of the equivalence of the two flavours of the single-bit OT.
To summarise, our result is not in contradiction to any no-go theorem, and while our
bit-string OT protocol is probably insecure against coherent attacks, even the opposite is
allowed by the known impossibility proofs.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a novel scheme for obliviously transferring a bit-string message
from Alice to Bob. The scheme presented does not violate the Lo’s no-go theorem [Lo97] and
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its security is based on the laws of quantum physics.
We proved that the protocol is secure against any cheating strategy of Bob before the
opening phase (the protocol is concealing) as well as against a cheating Alice (it is oblivious,
providing Alice maintains the probabilistic transfer). Furthermore, we proved that it satisfies
probabilistic transfer, provided Bob performs only “few-qubit” measurements, bounded by
a certain upper bound ℓ (the protocol is practically probabilistic). Although intuitively our
protocol should, at least for sufficiently large n, be secure against multi-qubit measurements,
a detailed analysis of its security against Bob’s coherent attacks remains to be done (similarly
as for the case of recently proposed and performed quantum signature protocols [DWA14,
CDD+14]).
Our protocol does not use entanglement and its optical implementation could be per-
formed using today’s technology. Indeed, as already mentioned, the current technology can
perform single-photon polarisation rotations for the values on n = 10 (and possibly higher),
which, using the standard photon emission and detection techniques (used, for example, in
quantum key distribution) can achieve OT protocols with short time differences between the
transferring and the opening phases. To achieve longer time differences, one would need to
use stable long-term quantum memories, which are beyond the current technology. Never-
theless, even the OT protocols with short times between the two phases have a number of
useful examples of multi-party computation applications, such as private data mining, zero-
knowledge proofs, etc. With the future advances of the technology, one can expect significant
improvements in producing stable quantum memories which could, potentially, allow for our
protocol to be used in applications that require for longer time-differences, such as quantum
e-voting.
Finally, we discuss the need for the use of hash functions. Recall that at the end of the
protocol Bob must be sure if he got the intended message or not. This property is guaranteed
by comparing the computed hash value of the received message m with the presumed hash
value sent by Alice together with m. Such acknowledgment of the validity of the message
decoded by Bob could be done differently. Suppose that out of all possible messages (PM),
Alice is constrained to send m from a smaller set of messages (VM), such that verifying that
m is in VM can be easily done, but only Alice knows the elements of VM. Note that in order
to keep the probability of receiving a message from Alice to 1/2, up to a negligible term, the
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size of VM must be exponentially smaller than the size of PM. For example, VM could be
the set of solutions to a hard mathematical problem, say 3-SAT problem. Alternatively, the
message sent might be written in an existing human language, say English, making it easily
recognisable by any English-language speaker.
Apart from (dis)proving the concealingness security criterion against the general coherent
attacks (performing a measurement on all qubits at once), future lines of research include
formulating other quantum security protocols that use single-qubit rotations to encode bit
values into quantum states taken from a number of different bases. One such immediate
application is in designing a quantum bit-string commitment protocol and compare it with
the existing proposals. Furthermore, similarly when generating (randomised) secret keys,
single-qubit rotations could be used in creating undeniable signatures.
In the proof of obliviousness of the protocol, Section 3.4, we considered as relevant the
encoded basis for which φi = siθn/2 ∈ [π/8, 3π/8] ∪ [5π/8, 7π/8]. This might suggest that
one can modify the protocol by using only those angles as possible encryption bases. Note
though that the concealingness of the protocol is based in the security of the public-key
criptographic system of [Nik08], which requires the whole range of equidistant angles. We
leave this as an interesting question for future research. Another interesting possibility would
be to further restrict the angles used, to those corresponding only to the computational and
the diagonal bases, thus sending only BB84 states. Note though that such protocol would
differ from our original idea in one important issue, that might affect its security. Namely, for
the choice of the states from the computational bases, the cases of a = 0 and a = 1 would be
indistinguishable (indeed was one of the reasons to exclude the case φ ≈ 0 from consideration
in the proof of obliviousness of our protocol). We leave this interesting possibility as a topic
for a future research.
An important future line of research is to go beyond the “proof of principle” presented in
this paper, and analyse quantitative effects of imperfect sources, noise and measurement errors
in the protocol’s optical realisations. In performing such study of the protocol’s quantitative
security levels in realistic applications, one can straightforwardly generalise the techniques
used in the study of noise and measurement errors of a practical two- and four-state bit-
commitment protocols, presented in [LAA+14, LAP+16].
26
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the support of SQIG – Security and Quantum Information Group,
the Instituto de Telecomunicac¸o˜es Research Unit, ref. UID/EEA/50008/2013, the IT project
QbigD funded by FCT PEst-OE/EEI/LA0008/2013, and the FCT project Confident PTDC/EEI-
CTP/4503/2014. A.S. also acknowledges the FCT Pos-doc scholarship SFRH/BPD/76231/2011
during which the major part of the work was done and LaSIGE Research Unit, ref. UID/CEC/
00408/2013.
A Authentication in multiparty computation
Oblivious transfer is a building block used to construct secure multi-party computation.
Loosely speaking, the secure multi-party computation of a function g(i1, . . . , ik) = (o1, . . . , ok)
is a protocol among k agents, which do not trust each other. The aim of the protocol is to
jointly compute function g such that, each agent Aℓ, with ℓ ∈ {1 . . . k}:
• inputs its private message iℓ, which is kept secret to the other agents;
• receives the private output oℓ, known only by Aℓ.
An example of a secure multi-party computation is private data mining, where there are two
agents (k = 2), say Alice and Bob, and Alice wishes to perform some statistics s over a private
database d of Bob. Thus, the function to compute is of the form g(⊥, d) = (s(d),⊥), where
⊥ means the empty string.
If Bob requires Alice to authenticate herself, in order to perform the statistics, a simple
way to enforce the authentication is for Alice to input a password w, and the statistics will
only be given if the password is correct, that is, if the hash of the password coincides with
the stored password hash hA = h(w) of Alice in Bob’s server (similar to computer login),
g(w, (d, hA)) =


(s(d),⊥) if h(w) = hA
(⊥,⊥) otherwise.
(22)
This idea can be generalised to any secure multi-party computation, assuming that each
party shares the hashes of the passwords of each all other agents. And so, instead of computing
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the function g(i1, . . . , ik) = (o1, . . . , ok), one computes the function
g((i1, w1,h1), . . . , (ik, wk,hk)) =


(o1, . . . , ok) if h(w1) = hA1 ∧ . . . ∧ h(wk) = hAk
(⊥, . . . ,⊥) otherwise,
(23)
where hℓ = (hA1 , . . . , hAℓ−1 , hAℓ+1 , . . . , hAk) is the string of hashes of the passwords of all
other agents but Aℓ. More details can be found in [Gol02].
B Notation, definitions and results
In this Appendix, we provide notation, necessary definitions and results for stating and prov-
ing the security of our proposal. First, we give the definition of quantum one-way functions,
based on [LF05, Nik08].
A quantum one-way function is a map f : N →H, where N ⊂ Z and H is a Hilbert space,
such that:
1. f is easy to compute: there is a polynomial-time (in the number of bits of the input s)
quantum algorithm that computes f(s) ∈ H, with s ∈ N ;
2. Hard to invert: without any additional information, inverting f(s) non-negligibly on the
input size is impossible by fundamental physical laws of quantum (information) theory.
If inversion is computed in polynomial-time using some additional information, called the
trapdoor, then f is called a trapdoor quantum one-way function. In a sense, the trapdoor is
a “key” to unlock the input s.
There are several candidates for quantum one-way functions studied in [GC01, BCWW01]
(a slightly different variation of quantum one-way function, with input being quantum as well,
was considered in [LF05]). Recently, another candidate for a quantum one-way function was
proposed in [Nik08]. This function considers qubit rotations R and is given by
f(s) = R(sθn) |0〉 = cos (sθn/2) |0〉+ sin (sθn/2) |1〉 (24)
where s ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1} and θn = π/2n−1, for some fixed n, and {|0〉 , |1〉} is a fixed
computational basis (i.e., f is not a function of a quantum state). Notice that this is a
quantum one-way function because:
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• Qubit rotations R(sθn) can be easily implemented up to an arbitrary accuracy by a
quantum algorithm involving an universal set of gates ([NC04], [Nik08]).
• Due to Holevo bound, the maximal amount of information that can be extracted by
means of a POVM on a single qubit is 1 bit. Since s has n bits, it is impossible to
recover s from a single qubit in the state R(sθn) |0〉.
Moreover, f can be used to construct a quantum trapdoor one-way function F (s, b), where
s is the trapdoor information for learning an unknown bit b [Nik08]:
F (s, b) = R(bπ)f(s) = R(bπ)R(sθn) |0〉 = R(sθn + bπ) |0〉 . (25)
Note that inverting F (learning both s and b) is at least as hard as inverting f . Also, the
ensemble of qubits, each in a state F (si, bi), where si and bi are random, is described by
a complete mixture ρ = 1/2, if si and bi are unknown [Nik08]. Therefore, every binary
measurement that could be used to infer unknown bit b would give completely random value.
Nevertheless, if s is known, by applying the rotation R(−sθn) to F (s, b) and measuring
the result in the computational basis, one obtains b with certainty. Therefore, F (s, b) is a
polynomial quantum trapdoor one-way function.
Based on the above discussion, we present the secure public-key cryptosystem proposed
in [Nik08]:
Protocol 3 (Public-Key Encryption Scheme).
Message to transfer: m = m1 . . . ml with l ≤ k;
Security parameter: n;
Secret key: s = (s1, . . . , sk), where each si ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1};
Public Key Generation:
1. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Alice chooses uniformly at random si ∈ {0, . . . , 2n −
1}, and s = (s1, . . . , sk) will be her private key.
2. Alice generates the corresponding public key:
|ψ〉 =
k⊗
i=1
R(siθn) |0〉 (26)
=
k⊗
i=1
(
cos
(
siθn
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
siθn
2
)
|1〉
)
. (27)
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Encryption:
3. Bob wishes to send message m = m1, . . . ml where l ≤ k.
4. Bob obtains Alice’s public key, |ψ〉.
5. Bob encrypts his message m (padded with 0 if necessary) as follows
|ψ(m)〉 =
k⊗
i=1
R(miπ) |ψ〉 (28)
=
k⊗
i=1
(
cos
(
siθn
2
+
miπ
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
siθn
2
+
miπ
2
)
|1〉
)
. (29)
6. Bob sends |ψ(m)〉 to Alice.
Decryption:
7. Alice uses private key as follows
|ψ′(m)〉 =
k⊗
i=1
R(−siθn) |ψ(m)〉 (30)
=
k⊗
i=1
(
cos
(
miπ
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
miπ
2
)
|1〉
)
(31)
=
k⊗
i=1
|mi〉 . (32)
8. Alice performs measurements on each |mi〉 in the computational basis.
Obviously, the Public-Key Generation corresponds to the computation of f(s), the En-
cryption phase computes F (s, b) and the Decryption phase corresponds to the inversion of
F (s, b) with the trapdoor information s, which allows to learn message m. As discussed in
Sections IV.B and IV.C of [Nik08] and also in [SNA12], even if Alice publicly announces n
the system is still secure. In fact, using the Holevo bound, the cryptographic scheme is infor-
mation secure if k, the length of the message is of same order than n. In fact, the maximum
information that Bob can obtain from the public key regarding the secret key is k bits, but
its uncertainty is nk, which in case of n = k implies a negligible advantage for an adver-
sary to recover the message. Furthermore, since any rotation leaves a complete mixed state
invariant, all possible messages yield the same cipher state, which is equal to a public-key
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state, and therefore adversaries cannot distinguish distinct messages, unless many copies of
the encrypted state and the respective public key are provided, making the scheme provably
secure [BR03, ZQ13].
In Figure 6 we present a schematic description of the public-key cryptosystem.
Figure 6: Schematic description of the public key cryptosystem for messages of length k. The
full arrows represent the actual states of qubits, while the dashed arrows in the third line
(encryption of a message) represent |0i〉 states.
At the end of the Oblivious transfer protocol, Bob has to be assured if he received the
message or not. There are different ways to guarantee this feature. The solution adopted in
this paper is to use a hash function. A hash function maps strings to other strings of smaller
size. Therefore, different strings are mapped to the same hash value. Hash functions have to
satisfy the following two constrains,
• their value for each input can be computed in polynomial time on the length of the
input string;
• The hash values of a randomly chosen string are uniformly distributed.
Consider two sets A and B of size a and b, respectively, such that a > b, and consider
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a hash function h : A → B. It is easy to derive that the size of a set Ax of strings x ∈ A
mapped to the same hash value h(x) is at most a/b.
In particular, requiring that A contains all strings of length k and B to be a set of strings of
length ω = ⌊√k⌋, the number of strings with the same hash value is 2ω, hence the probability
of finding such a string is negligible in k. For more details on constructing hash functions,
see for example [CW79].
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